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Disciplinarity and value commitment: disciplinary rationales and competing 
approach to knowledge creation and assessing new-emerging innovation.
Kristrún Gunnarsdóttir1 and Niels van Dijk2
Abstract: The Horizon 2020 framework programme for research and innovation is promoting an
approach referred to as Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI).1 Mandates to implement and
mainstream RRI are already evident, whereby  interdisciplinarity and  integration are treated as
pre-given  in  accounts  of  what  the  RRI  approach  is  in  practice.  In  this  paper,  our  point  of
departure  is  to  ask  what  to  expect  realistically  when  experts  and  professionals  are  brought
together  across  disciplines,  institutions  and  national  borders  in  practical  attempts  to  achieve
interdisciplinarity and integration of approach to innovation. We revisit Woolgar's and Ashmore's
treatise on social epistemology in their development of the reflexive thesis in the late 1980s, and
we revisit the turn to practice in STS in the early 2000s. We present our analysis of commitment
to matters of practical sensitivity and reflexivity in reference to the philosophical influences and
study objectives of the reflexive thesis and  the practice turn and we  consider how sociological
studies have articulated expert practices and  the use of knowledge and skill.  We address the
epistemological challenges innovation assessments face  in justifying the relationship they draw
between study objects, observation, interpretation and representation and  in justifying
ideologically and methodologically their own production of knowledge about how others produce
knowledge. We address the implications this work has for the development of interdisciplinarity
and  integration  in  case  studies  we  have  observed,  of  evaluating  new-emerging  innovation
domains. We argue  that the consequences of  advancing reflexivity (or awareness of it) as  a
progressive step forward, rather than a problem to remedy, is critical in shaping a more balanced
approach to innovation, even though achieving interdisciplinarity and integration is fragmented
and partial.
1  Lancaster University
2  Vrije Universiteit Brussel
1 See https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/responsible-research-innovation .
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Introduction 
This  paper  draws on research embedded in a  larger  project  which was designed to better
understand the roles of formal and informal assessment methods with the aim to 'contribute to
shaping an integrated framework, conducive to a better and more balanced assessment of
emerging sciences, technologies and related societal innovations'.2 The  project  partners  have
conducted four case studies of new-emerging domains of innovation to explore how different
types of assessments come into play with reference to the promises and achievements of each of
these domains: 1) wearable sensors for health and self care, fitness and wellbeing; 2) autonomy in
robotic systems for care and companionship; 3) synthetic/in-vitro meat, and 4) the future smart
grid. We will not dwell on the details of each of these cases, i.e., what they discovered about
research and development trends and future visions within the respective innovation domains, nor
what  they  reported  of  relevance  to  policy  involvement  and intervention.  That  information  is
readily available elsewhere.3 The research presented addressed our  agency of observation and
reflexivity to support internal  examinations  within  this  larger  project. of how the  different
assessment frameworks might achieve disciplinary approximations within each case study. More
specifically, this paper explores how to make sense of  the initial stage of establishing mutual
working recognition of the assessments used amongst case study partners.
We argue that a carefully considered orientation to practice and disciplinarity is  strongly
suggestive of pathways towards better and more balanced assessments of the innovation domains
in question. It provides the framing to discuss and reflect upon the  enablers and  constraints in
different approaches, with a view to disciplinary approximations that are indicative of potential
complementarity, modularity, convergence and harmonization.  Ideally, this  engagement with
enablers  and constraints  should  help  in  developing a sustained dialogue with innovators and
research leaders, whose visions and products the  assessments  are  evaluating. It  should help
develop a sustained dialogue with decision-makers in matters of innovation policy. Accordingly,
in setting in motion this agency of observation and reflexivity, we draw attention to the ways in
which expert practices are articulated, observed, communicated and performed in philosophical
and sociological studies, and what the tenets of reflexivity have had to offer them. Our aim in this
paper is to draw together a set of learnings from these studies and explain how they  serve as
building blocks for critical discussion with innovators and policy-makers as well as within the
case study groups, in particular, on ways to integrate formal and informal assessments.
2 EC FP7 Science in Society, Work Programme 2011.1.1.1-4.
3 http://epinet.no/content/epinet-project .
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In the following sections, we first  proceed with our review of  studies of practice and the
reflexive thesis. We begin by explaining some of the philosophical influences and study
objectives. In particular, we consider the example of  how sociological studies have articulated
expert practices, the use of knowledge and skill, and we discuss the implications of this example
for various kinds of reflexivity emerging in reference to study interest in expert practice and in
reference to the epistemological challenges disciplines are generally faced with in:
1. justifying the relationship they draw between study objects, observation, interpretation
and representation;
2. justifying ideologically and methodologically the production of knowledge about how
others produce knowledge.
We then draw together some of the consequences of depicting reflexivity as a problem to be
solved rather than advancing necessary reflexivity (or awareness of it) as a progressive step
forward, and we explore some of the implications the key learnings have for methodological
development aiming towards interdisciplinarity in the development of innovation assessments.
Finally, we discuss our concerns with the shaping of an integrated framework, with the need to
clarify enablers and constrains, and respective roles of formalities and informalities in shaping a
more balanced approach to innovation.
A note on practice theories and the reflexive thesis
No comparison is legitimate if the parties compared cannot each present his [sic] own
version of what the comparison is about; and each must be able to resist the imposition
of irrelevant criteria. In other words, comparison must not be unilateral and, especially,
must not be conducted in the language of just one of the parties (Stengers, 2011, p. 56).
Of particular relevance to our explorations of practice studies and the reflexive thesis, is to 
outline the consequences of disciplinary favouritism, boundary work and reflexivity in orienting 
to, approaching and practising expertise. To this end, we address the influence of Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy in a 'turn to practices' within various branches of sociological and adjacent 
disciplinary interests in expert knowledge and skilled practice. Certain traditions within Science 
and Technology Studies (STS) are more often implicated here than others, including studies of 
laboratory work and the ethnomethodology of technical labour. In particular, a glimpse into 
historical shifts in the sociology of S&T knowledge and expertise can help to elaborate the 
relevance of these influences for the case studies we have been observing, including a glimpse 
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into incommensurable readings of Wittgenstein's later philosophy and the implications thereof for
thinking about practice and reflexivity.
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations support a philosophical shift away from theories of
universal truths and general explanatory principles of how we establish meaningful knowledge of
the world. In his investigations, Wittgenstein invites his readers to look carefully at everyday
practices in which we engage with ordinary phenomena and use language about it. This interest in
practice has an empirical application with emphasis on looking 'at particularities of events, to
consider what is happening from close by' (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 51). As Wittgenstein also puts
it, we are observing a form of life in which objects and their meaning, i.e., how they are
interpreted – rules and rule following – are negotiated and established in and through actual use.
Early influence of Wittgenstein in sociology (Winch, 1990[1958]) is implicated in a significant
shift in thinking about scientific knowledge claims during the 1970s and early 80s (e.g. Barnes,
1974; Bloor, 1976; Collins, 1981; Collins, 1983). Sociologists of Scientific Knowledge (SSK)
were breaking with the classical rational-irrational distinction of how and why we come to
believe in facts or false claims. They were taking interest in the epistemological contents of
science as a legitimate topic for sociological analysis and they were arguing that all knowledge
claims (true or false, scientific or common sense) are socially constructed or, in any event,
thoroughly socially constituted. In this tradition, Wittgenstein's claim that we are observing a
form of life and that we should not be asking for meaning but looking at use (i.e. practice), was
employed by the SSK programme to 'crack the mystery' of the so-called indeterminacy thesis
(Quine's (1992) indeterminacy of translation). The long-standing philosophical scepticism that
problematises  how a  rule  can  be  followed or  how one can  know the  world  more  generally,
translated into a  particular  reading of Wittgenstein's  call  for looking at  use—at  forms of life.
Namely, it gave sociologists the means to grant the social an ontological status of a fundamental
explanatory principle for how we can interpret, as in how we can follow a rule, attribute meaning,
know the world, and so on.
 Other philosophers had  similarly paved the way for sociological interest in technical work
during this time period of  the  late  1970s  and  early  80s  (e.g. Polanyi, 1962; Kuhn, 1962;
Feyerabend, 1975). Early technology studies are diverse in approach and the claims they make,
and so are the philosophies. But, what many of these early studies share with the SSK programme
is how sociologists found in philosophy of the day the means to hold the social responsible for
conditions, decisions and concerns of technologists and technical labourers (see discussion in
Lynch, 1982). In other words, the empirical study programmes that developed, and are now well
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established in Science and Technology Studies, were all attempts to break open the `black boxes'
of technology. Sociological reasoning was put at the top of the agenda to explain technical
artefacts, systems and technical work on the basis of social-historical origins, circumstances and
social epistemology.
However, there are different ways in which we can 'turn to practice' (see Schatzki, Knorr-
Cetina and von Savigny,  2001).4 The object of enquiry can be the epistemological contents of
science, technical expertise and labour. It can be the making of artefacts, a know-how, a set of
presuppositions, paradigms and skills. Furthermore, any practical action will quickly exceed that
which can be made explicit which then is typically explained by referring to other dimensions
that comprise the missing components. According to this line of reasoning, such components
remain largely unseen and are inexplicable except by a simple and generalised reference to
practice—socialised, enculturated, discursive and embodied practice.5
Some of the early laboratory studies are very particular about the social nature of this 'tacit
dimension'. They argue that the unique epistemological quality of doing expert work is grounded
in social interaction, more precisely, in personal contact, discussion and demonstration (e.g.
Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Collins, 1992). Collins, for instance, takes an example of replicating an
engineering know-how which, he argues, necessarily required personal contact and discussion to
obtain 'a crucial component of the requisite knowledge' (Collins, 1992, p.55). However, the so-
called practice turn in STS generally resists this reduction of tacitness to merely social
interactions. Interest in technological developments and change had already drawn attention to
the role of matter, objects and embodiment and the practices of refiguring environments and
social-material relations (e.g. Latour, 1987; Pickering, 1992; Bijker and Law, 1992; Knorr-Cetina,
1999). In other words, the tacit embodied practices of interacting with objects, instruments and
environments were already an important source of explanation and theoretical grounding of
knowledge and skill before the so-called practice turn.
A lurking problem here which is relevant to the case studies we observe, is how sociologists
have positioned themselves as legislators who identify and codify the norms, rules and
regularities that are followed by practitioners of various other disciplines (e.g. Bauman, 2003).
For example, a  general disposition among sociologists has been to interpret practical action as
either behavioural regularities which are described from an observer's (their) point of view or
they are interpreted (by them) as subjected to norms that can justify behaviour in terms for which
4 Stengers remarks that in the 'practice turn', the direction that is to be abandoned is much more clear than the 
direction that is to be taken (Stengers, 2006).
5 See also Polanyi (1966) on the essential 'tacit dimension' of practical action as knowing how to proceed in certain
situations on the basis of one's mastery of relevant skills, knowledge and paradigms.
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correctness is measured and sanctions administered.6 Turner (2001) talks about sociologists
imposing a tacit book of rules on practices. Jordan and Lynch also point out how the project of
opening up the 'black boxes' of technology during the 1980s became a rallying cry to
contextualise the technical by revealing hidden motives, interests and origins in a social domain
(Jordan and Lynch, 1992; see also Lynch, 1982, 1985; Lynch, 1993, pp.265-271).
These sociological dispositions and the studies that follow that tradition have typically
produced 'disqualifications' of others, that skilled and knowledgeable practitioners do not
sufficiently understand their own practices. As Lynch has argued, the very 'criticalness' of these
efforts is indeed achieved by portraying practitioners as if they lack in ability to access the
circumstances of their own work—the essential 'social dimension' within which the knowledge
and the skills they perform are constituted. One can argue that these are essentially depictions of
inadequacy and as such they risk insulting the practitioners whose practices come under scrutiny,
rather than contributing to the ongoing work in ways which are useful and sensitive, engaging
and amplifying. Depictions of inadequacy shift the attention away from the ways in which
practitioners rely on each other's competencies in the course of some actual shared  working
practice. The risk is also that casting tacit embodied knowledge in terms of generalisable in-
practice phenomena is simply filling a void when practitioners give no explicit account of the
circumstances of their work—a void which then grants sociologists their claims about, say,
socially governed unconscious choices (see discussion in Lynch, 1993, p.266). The lesson here
for our observations  is twofold. It turns on the commitment each partner has to evaluating the
claims and the practices of scientists and innovators whose innovation practices have come under
scrutiny in one or another of the four case studies. It also turns on the commitment the partners
have to one another, in exploring and better understanding the respective roles of their
methodological and ideological approaches to innovation and assessments of what they find. In
acting on these commitments, the ideal disposition is to demonstrate an adequate level of
sensitivity and engagement across disciplinary boundaries, if only for the key purpose of
identifying and developing an epistemic networks of innovation, policy and assessment.
Understanding reflexivity
We now turn to different understandings of reflexivity and its association with relativism and
interpretivism. As Woolgar once argued (1988a), there is much loose talk about reflexivity and
6 Rouse has explicitly distinguished these two 'concepts of practice' in his contribution to the practice turn (Rouse, 
2001).
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the term is still applied in many and often confusing ways. For example, reflexivity is taken to
mean the kind of introspection and reflection that forces practitioners to pause and critically
explore the modes of doing that dominate their work. Reflexivity is called for in relation to one or
another controversy in which the approach of some practical involvement becomes itself a part of
the problems associated with that controversy and with sorting it out. It takes the shape of 'self-
reflective' gestures among practitioners with reference as well to the potentials and limits of 'self-
knowledge' within governing bodies and other institutions (e.g. Barben et al, 2007; Voss, 2006;
Wynne, 2002). To summarise, reflexivity is targeting what amounts to a demand for much more
careful thinking about what one is doing, to see confessions, inside stories, and other addenda
which is the product of benign in(tro)spection aimed at improving the adequacy of connections
between analysts’  statements and the objects of those statements—more generally, the
improvement of a practice and its accountability.
One can argue that the kind of reflexivity we have described so far is primarily psychological
in its thrust and does not lead to further epistemological investigations, challenges and
recommendations. Therefore, we offer in addition – and emphasise – considerations for the kind
of reflexivity that can be found embedded in the very constituents of practice. We shall draw
attention to reflexivity which is integral to certain aspects of practice-in-action (expert or
otherwise), including the constitution of ordinary logics used to formulate and articulate
knowledge, i.e., reflexivity as logical necessity.
In Woogar's edited volume on reflexivity (Woolgar, 1988b) we find discussions of post-hoc
and general reflexivity, infra-reflexivity, meta-reflexivity, constitutive and immediate reflexivity.
Regarding the last two on this list, we can also consult discussion in Garfinkel's treatment of
reflexively accountable action and the documentary method of interpretation (Garfinkel, 1967;
also Lynch, 1993). We shall take stock of some of these elaborations as we articulate the
epistemological challenges of reflexivity that seem most relevant to progressing the assessment
case work.
Relativism, interpretivism and reflexivity
In the introduction to the reflexive project, Woolgar and Ashmore (1988) situate reflexivity as
the Next Step in explorations of a relativist and constructivist tradition. In particular, the shift
towards studying the epistemological contents of scientific claims and technical work had already
introduced new forms and methods of relativising both scientific and sociological research. A
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connection here between relativism and reflexivity is demonstrated in the ways in which
researchers construe a relationship between observed phenomena and representations of them, as
well as how they conceive of the agent of representation (the observer, the analyst and
interpreter). However, according to Woolgar (1988a), relativism does not necessitate reflexivity.
Rather, we can find necessity in the connection between the two by virtue of discovering the
relevancy constraints that tie us to a particular set of interpretations on a case-by-case basis—of
identifying differences and similarities among objects, meanings and social-cultural roles, albeit
with interpretative flexibility. 
The cultural relativism which is traditionally associated with cultural anthropology is of some
consequence here, i.e., in the espousal of its scholarship in which achieving knowledge of others
is manifest as an explicit epistemological concern for the ways in which interpretations of others
are constructed and represented. One could argue that the problem of understanding beliefs and
the actions of others is primarily a problem of logics in translating the reasoning of one culture
into another. However, that cultural other is typically treated as a distinct analytic object.
The espousal of cultural relativism enabled sociologists of science and technology to treat their
subjects' achievements, beliefs, knowledge claims and artefacts as socially/culturally contingent
products, as seen through the lens of sociological reasoning. For example, the production
scientific facts became an accomplishment that could only be achieved within the culturally
distinct settings of science laboratories. But the general lesson is that a group of investigators can
interpret a culture as clearly distinct from their own, and it is in this distancing of social-cultural
roles that they can legitimise their own production of facts about how the others produce their
facts. The investigators appear to operate at a higher epistemological level than their subjects, so
to speak, which is exacerbated by a tendency towards exoticism in describing the subjects and
articulating knowledge about what they know and do. In other words, analytic distance privileges
and sets apart the method of the observer from the method of the observed. However, as this
scholarly tradition is increasingly informed by and symptomatic of long-standing critiques of
idealised points of view in observation, interpretation and representations of culture, a question
remains of how research ideals and methodologies deal with the postulates of distinctiveness and
similarity, and what kind of reflexivity survives. Blanket faith in fieldwork objectivity has
vanished and all achievements, beliefs, knowledge claims and artefacts can be treated as
socially/culturally contingent. The indication is that antagonisms in descriptive-analytic
representations highlight, at least momentarily, the ambivalence in the interpretative process, as
scholars position the interpretative work they do somewhere on a continuum between benign
introspection and constitutive reflexivity. We shall now take a closer look at the shifts in
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sociological traditions of reasoning about scientific knowledge claims and technical expertise, to
further shed light on the different manifestations of reflexivity.
Post-hoc reflexivity
The SSK programme and emerging traditions in technology and laboratory studies at the time,
made the general argument, using social-cultural relativism, that scientific knowledge claims and
technical expertise are the contingent products of various social, cultural and historical processes.
That particular sociological knowledge, however, was not addressed using the same logics, which
is what Collins refers to as compartmentalisation (see Collins, 1992, methodological appendix).
Some of the consequences of these relativised orientations are explored in Woolgar and
Ashmore's introduction to the reflexive project (Woolgar and Ashmore, 1988). We learn that a
general issue of reflexivity emerges once it is recognised that sociological knowledge can also be
understood as a contingent product of various social, cultural and historical processes.
Furthermore, the relationship between sociological research methods and the research object
being sociological in nature, necessitates assumption about similarities which points to
constitutive reflexivity.
What resulted from a shift in the sociological study tradition, was inconsistency between
realist studies of social factors and relativised studies of findings in nature and in technological
constructs. Reflexivity emerged as a demand for symmetry and consistency. As Woolgar and
Ashmore also point out, the methodological attitude made SSK and related study programmes
inherently vulnerable when sociological reasoning about the reasoning of others became too
easily turned back onto itself (also Woolgar, 1988a; Ashmore, 1989). Nevertheless, the dominant
recommendations have been to assume cultural and methodological distinctions, rather than
similarities, and leave the reflexive tenet out of the course of the essential explanatory task of the
sociological discipline—i.e., to explain expert knowledge in the making, explain closures, and so
on. As Latour has argued, sociologists continue to depict the social as if it were a glue that holds
the world together. They have granted it an unquestioned fundamental status of an explanatory
principle in a quest for new kinds of truths, in this case, about natural and technical knowledge
(Latour, 2005). To this end, nature remains uncertain while society does not, or as Callon put it:
'When the society described by sociologists confronts nature, society always has the last word'
(Callon, 1986: p.198).
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Constitutive reflexivity
While the introspective version of reflexivity serves primarily as a quality control and
governance tool, it also reinforces idealisations of representation, of natural and social realism
(philosophically speaking). Such idealisations are perhaps useful in the sense that they are
conducive to involving scientists in speculative reflections about their work. Scientists can
typically assume without hesitation that observers and the studied objects are of essentially
different kinds. For example, constitutive reflexivity could only occur in physics if physicists had
to take into account that atoms have belief systems, theories about their own nature, their
interactions, and so on. Constitutive reflexivity in their work has an entirely different focus. It
concerns, among other things, the ways in which the variables they build into their experimental
systems dictate what those same systems can and cannot deliver.
Other manifestations of constitutive reflexivity hinge in this way as well on how the postulates
of differentiation, similarity and, last but not least, interdependence, are managed in the face of
immediacy and circularity in a reflexive constitution. As we have seen, reflexivity emerges with
reference to the observer and the observed, object and interpretation, object and representation. It
also emerges in reference to object and measurement, cause and effect, a rule and its following,
an object and its context, and numerous other relational interpretations which traditionally are
assumed to be held together by entities that are otherwise independent one of the other. These
conventional assumptions are not just intuitive truths arising from expert and ordinary reasoning
alike, and ultimately based on how we learn from childhood to order the world and depict aspects
of it. They are studied ontological statements about entities in the world and their relations, and
they are studied epistemological statements about how we can know them and what they do.
They suggest methods to formulate propositions and articulate problems, make use of criteria and
decision rules, all of which tie research designs into scholarly traditions (see related discussion in
Hacking, 2002). But there are problems which are difficult to resolve. Measurements are always
indirect, empirical references never completely adequate and, with respect to sociality, one could
argue that law-like statements are not adding anything to what is already ordinarily observable at
a site of activity. In sociological research more specifically, there is no escape from common-
sense reasoning about social phenomena even if the objective of a sociological investigation is to
develop credible sociological reasoning about social phenomena. All persons use a method in
their reasoning, for example, to assess what is definitely going on in a given event or an instance
of action. To this end, the so-called documentary method of interpretation is seeing and treating
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an actual instance as a document of some recognised or presupposed pattern, which in turn is
confirmed and legitimised because of an actual instance that occurs (e.g. Garfinkel, 1967, p.76-
103). This way, anyone can identify what appears to be a norm, what the general conditions are in
a given setting, what an instance is an instance of, and so on.
To sum up, it may appear that philosophical scepticism will have the upper hand if the
conclusion here is, that hypothesising stable theoretical arrangements to measure against remains
essentially indeterminable for the purposes of identifying an idealised standpoint for a practice or
a practitioner, to find a way to follow a rule, measure an object, observe, represent, and so on.
But, to come back to the influence of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, the counterargument, and a
substantively different reading of Wittgenstein, is to say that indeterminacy is not a theoretical or
inductive problem for which a remedy is needed, say, the social or some other principle of
fundamental explanatory status. For example, we run into problems explaining why controversies
close or not because the supposed cause is not independent of the effect to be explained.
Constitutive reflexivity is manifest in immediate circularity and interdependence which suggests
that research processes always assume some of the answers they set out to find which, notably, is
also what people normally do. So, the 'next step' could be to treat the indeterminacy thesis  as
completely internal to the sites in which objects and observation, measurements, interpretations,
rules and context, cause and effect, so on and so forth, are effectively (re)negotiated and
(re)established over time—the sites of reflexivity and reflexively accountable action (see Lynch,
1993).
Reflexivity: a problem or progression forward
From what we have learnt, it appears that discussions about reflexivity primarily portray it as a
problem and a source of difficulty, rather than a progressive step forward in the relativised and
reflexive project of generating knowledge about how knowledge takes shape across disciplinary
boundaries. SSK researchers adopted a formulaic approach as a 'solution' to the 'difficulty', which
enabled them to be relativist about scientists’ knowledge practices but realist in the production of
their own research. Constitutive reflexivity only applied at the epistemological level post-hoc but
was disengaged from standardised practice because  abandoning the relativist pole was the
dominant recommendation on how to proceed. Many responses to the implications of constitutive
reflexivity have indeed centred on how to improve conventional criteria, decision rules and
models—to develop better schemes for observation, the coding of data, rigorous analyses but,
nevertheless, to use 'reflexive accounting' which acknowledges introspectively the shortcomings
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of both quantitative and qualitative methods (e.g. Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Atkinson et al,
2001). In other words, achieving stability in what can be said about knowledge-making practices
requires measured efforts to overcome reflexivity. Mainstream sociology does not accept that no
principle will sort out conflicts. To abandon the theoretical leverage provided by an idealisation
of the social scientific observer seems unthinkable.
Other approaches however, have suggested that reflexivity is a progressive way forward, for
example, to explore literary expressions that can keep constitutive reflexivity at bay while
simultaneously allowing it a central position. Latour would argue that, in spite of the overarching
emphasis on mapping the material-semiotic constituents of actor-networks, we are after all
simply telling stories which points to some sort of infra-reflexivity. Also, since text is thought to
operate at a different level from the world about which it reports, one recommendation has been
to find ways to recover and sustain the kinds of uncertainties that only exist in the early stages of
enquiry, i.e., before the construction of the text has solidified the concepts and categories used in
the reporting. The literary experiments in the late 1980s and early 90s, representing one or
another form of so-called meta-reflexivity, play on such uncertainties and the early works were
often very artistic. They include playwriting, fiction, performance art, co-authored dialogues, and
collages of mixed media (e.g. Ashmore, Mulkay & Pinch, 1989; Pinch and Pinch, 1988). But, one
can argue that these literary experiments have also shifted the reflexive project around full circle,
back  towards benign introspection and reflection. The authors produce conventional analyses
about scientific claims and technical expertise through alternative media and forms of
representation, and in ways which aim at being taken seriously as analysts among peers even if
the literary experiments as such deny them a positioning as scientists. To what extent these
developments can be considered progressive we leave unanswered. They appear to primarily
suggest new forms of introspection and reflection. There is in fact little in the way of embracing
constitutive and immediate reflexivity in research, as substantively-observably evident but
unproblematic, apart from studies in ethnomethodology (see Button, 1991).
Summary and its implications for interdisciplinarity and integration in innovation assessment
We started by suggesting that research traditions in sociology have faced significant
complications in justifying their methods and reasoning—complications that provide important
examples of enablers, constraints, risks and vulnerabilities in orienting to, approaching and
practising expertise. The critiques sociologists have faced, with respect to disciplinary
favouritism, boundary work and reflexivity, have been posed to a large extent as epistemological
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challenges but  also as  recommendations, both of which are strongly suggestive of the kinds of
disciplinary issues to consider in attempts  to  achieve  interdisciplinarity  and  integration  in
innovation assessment. There are significant challenges to keep in mind, if only to moderate
disciplinary or methodological privileging, and remind the partners of how problem-
identification, propositions and decision criteria concerning the interpretive pairing we have been
considering, are all practice-specific achievements which, taken together, form an ecology of
practices (Stengers, 2005).
The task for such case studies is twofold. Each partner is committed to evaluating the claims
and the practices of scientists and innovators of  the epistemic networks associated with an
innovation  domain  and  its  assessment. The partners are also committed to one another in
exploring and better understanding the respective roles of their methodological and ideological
approaches, as members of epistemic networks themselves. But, before addressing further
specific implications for the case studies, we shall first continue summarising our notes on studies
of practice and the reflexive thesis. 
To first address our treatment of scholarly interests in practice, it is a noteworthy example how
sociologists have positioned themselves as legislators who identify and codify the norms, rules
and regularities in the actions of others. Not only does this positioning signal self-declared
disciplinary privilege, but a bulk of the critique of sociological reasoning centres on its
commitment to structures, systems and unifying explanatory principles. Some practice theorists
concur in a different view, that knowledge, meaning, action and language are not determined in
reference to abstract structures or systems. There are no hidden structures that can explain the
phenomena of practice. Accordingly, it is also the case that the phenomena of practice are not
explained in reference to individuals and their intentions and mental states. Practices are not
reducible in that way.
One way of responding here is to argue that practices are situated somewhere 'in-between'
macro and micro referents, which is in keeping with relatively recent developments in social
theory. For example, Giddens deliberately avoids privileging one over the other of the structure-
agency or system-actor pairs (e.g. Giddens, 1986). According to the theory of structuration,
individual actors can draw upon pre-existing sets of rules and resources which are contextually
resident within an existing structure in a particular domain. i.e., there are always sets of rules and
resources available to individual actors in the practices that reproduce social systems. Another
way of responding here is to consider more carefully Wittgenstein's influence on the studies of
practice, including studies of technical work and ethnomethodology, to say that all talk of 'levels'
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is entirely unnecessary for it does not add anything to the observable-reportable situatedness of
actual practice. In other words, a 'theory' or a heuristic of articulating what a practice consists of,
concerns the visible and what practitioners themselves have to say and show for what the know
and do.
It follows from here – to summarise our treatment of the reflexive thesis – how one reading of
Wittgenstein after all  supports a theory of a universal truth and a general explanatory principle,
i.e., sociality and the social, whereas a very different reading of his Philosophical Investigations
does not support anything of the kind (see debate in Bloor 1992 and Lynch 1992a, b; also
discussion in Lynch,  1993:  75-76). The relationships that can be drawn up within these
incommensurable readings are:
1. Wittgenstein's treatment of use, practice, form of life, is deliberately used to crack an
assumed mystery in the face of constitutive reflexivity which is seen as a serious
philosophical and practical problem (e.g. Winch, 1990[1958];  Bloor, 1976). First, the
relativising project threatens to render any philosophical realism impossible. Secondly,
when doubting there are such things as straightforward interpretations, philosophical
scepticism dictates that one is confronted with countless questions about the very task
of interpreting, and the interpretative flexibility goes along with uncertainty about
where one can stop asking the questions.
2. Wittgenstein's treatment of use, practice, form of life, suggests there is no mystery to
crack about rule-following and other interpretative tasks, however, with radical anti-
causalist and anti-epistemological implications (e.g. Sharrock and Button, 1999).
Constitutive reflexivity is not a problem, rather, it points to sites of practice in which
phenomena and that which can be said about them and done with them, is
(re)negotiated and (re)established over time in a reflexively accountable manner.
Interpretive flexibility is not a problem either, nor is uncertainty, for the very
immediacy of reflexivity swiftly uncovers the relevancy constraints of any meaningful
action or claim.
The immediate relevance of the explorations  we have  outlined  here would be to suggest
reflexivity of the introspective and reflective kind—to recommend that each partner let their hair
down, so to speak, and confront their own orientations, approach and practice of expertise, their
orientations to explanatory principles and universal theory, their relationship with the
development of social theory in particular, and of a long history of socially, ethically, legally, and
policy-relevant studies of science, technology and innovation.  Another immediate relevance,
concerns the fact that all partners in the consortium have some disciplinary overlap with
sociological research directed at science, technology and innovation. The partners already
recognise disciplinary distinctions and similarities among themselves which are further clarified
in and through the work on  each case study, i.e., what the disciplinary range is, including the
wider network of  innovation practitioners and policy makers, and what the implication are for
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approaching and orienting to others.
At this juncture, the concept of an 'ecology of practices' can help tying the question of what
constitutes one practice to a question of its co-existence in an environment of other practices
(Stengers, 2005, 2006). In such an ecology, no practice is ever just a social practice or a social
construction or a technical enterprise. Rather, the specific ways in which practices diverge over
time is crucial for their co-existence. In this vain, approaching innovation practices as they
diverge, is to feel their boundaries by way of experimenting with the relevancy constraints of
questioning and probing practitioners, albeit, in a manner that systematically avoids mobilizing
them in defence against attack (Stengers, 2005, p. 184). Ideally, this approach should be multi-
directional whereby each practice is addressed in terms of the  obligations that visibly engage
practitioners in achieving their work satisfactorily, in serving and answering to the requirements
of their trade. In that case, the relevancy constraints emerge in the course of solving specific
problems together in some shape or form.
Although one can argue that very few disciplines are neatly bounded or siloed, misalignments
are still  prone to emerge when practitioners recognisably  cross the  disciplinary boundaries of
their practice. There are no guarantees that one practitioner can take the place of another solely
on the basis of some overlap in orientation to problem-finding and problem solution.
Furthermore, in situations where boundary work or boundary negotiations pose a significant
challenge (on boundary work, see also Lee, 2005; Wynne and Dressel, 2001; Shackley and
Wynne, 1996; Bloomfield and Vurdubakis,  1994), there are no 'extra-territorial' methods ready-
to-hand for defining what matters to the parties involved. Each party has different constraints,
risks and vulnerabilities to consider. Each working relationship should be considered a significant
practical achievement. It is achieved in and through new articulations produced  between the
parties involved in response to common interests and problems. Each party can then produce their
'local' disciplinary versions of what is the case and what is at stake if they need to. In other words,
the art of establishing working relations rests on a  kind  of  diplomacy that mixes shared
representations with certain degree of 'abandonment'. Common interest in some issue, a problem
definition and problem solution, is produced not because these are the same or even similar
across disciplines, but because their alignment is approximated through selective and pragmatic
learning.
We can say for sure about our observations of the case studies in innovation assessment that
underpin  this  paper, that  an adequate approach to the work of assessing the four innovation
domains to-date does not only consist of descriptions of different tools and concepts, but also of
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clarifying the constraints and enablers with which the work is judged by peers and institutional
arrangements. Paradoxically, in bringing different practices together, these elements can only be
well understood in and through actual disciplinary approximations. The establishment of relations
between different assessment practices has  to  be  invented to provide specific solutions to
concrete issues that are identified in the course of doing this work. In this sense, the case studies
provide a good basis for experimenting with the question of how obligations and requirements
can be connected in some way. The results of the case studies will then have themselves become
enabling of a framework for better balanced evaluations. Finally, it is worth considering how
bounded each of the partners are to disciplinary identity and practice—how  there is a
recognisable home practice or a disciplinary group of which the partner is a representative.
Considering the history of Science and Technology Studies, for instance, the answer is yes and
no, suggesting that each of the partners will  need to consider their place among peers and the
implications for the boundaries of their practice when committing like diplomats to a project they
share with others. This potential double-bind differentiates, on the one hand, practitioners who
are mutually constrained by the project in which they are working towards a common goal (have
you fulfilled the terms and objectives of the project contract and arrived at some kind of
integration?). On the other hand, it differentiates the binding constraints of a representative who
returns with results (what space have you created for 'us' in the integration you have been
working towards?).
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